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measures to comply with the new ruling. I utilize this difference as an instrument 
in researching how female representation on company boards affects both the 
overall female employee share, and women’s earnings. 
 
Finnish state-owned companies are divided into three categories by ownership: 
companies owned by the central government, companies owned by the munici-
palities, and companies owned by the Åland government. The companies are 
heterogenous in most matters, varying in purpose, size and other aspects; however, 
they are all similarly affected by the quota. In addition to my main regressions, 
where I include all state-owned companies, I run regressions where I limit the 
sample to include only government-owned companies to research whether there is 
a difference in outcome that might depend on ownership. Regardless of controls or 
instruments, I find no such difference. 
  
Ultimately, my research design fails, as Finnish state-owned companies fail to 
comply with the law in every year on average. Without near full compliance, my 
instrumental variables regressions provide unsatisfying results which cannot be 
interpreted as causal. However, I do provide evidence of a positive correlation 
between the share of women on company boards and female representation in the 
top earning echelons. Furthermore, I discuss different explanations to why Finnish 
state-owned companies fail to comply with the law and argue that the most 
persuasive reason is the absence of sanctions for non-compliance. 
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Abstrakt 
Våren 2005 röstade den finska riksdagen igenom en reform av lagen om jämställdhet 
mellan kvinnor och män. Reformen introducerade en könskvot, som tvingade finländska 
offentligt ägda bolag att ha en jämn könsfördelning i styrelsen. Eftersom finländska 
offentligt ägda bolag hade varierande könsfördelning innan könskvotens införande, så 
påverkade kvoten företagen olika mycket. Företag som redan hade en jämn könsfördelning 
behövde inte ta några åtgärder, medan företag som hade noll kvinnor i styrelsen behövde 
ta jämförelsevis stora åtgärder för att nå en jämn könsfördelning. Jag använder denna 
skillnad som ett instrument för att undersöka könskvotens inverkan på andelen kvinnor 
anställda i företaget, och kvinnors löner. 
 
Finländska offentligt ägda bolag delas in i tre kategorier enligt ägarstruktur: bolag kontro-
llerade av staten, kommunalt ägda bolag, och bolag ägda av Ålands landskapsregering. 
Bolagen är heterogena i flera aspekter, då de till exempel skiljer sig i syfte och storlek. 
Gemensamt är att alla bolag påverkas likvärdigt av könskvoten. Utöver mina huvudsakliga 
regressioner där jag inkluderar alla offentligt ägda bolag, så väljer jag att köra regressioner 
där jag begränsar mitt sampel till bolag kontrollerade av staten för att undersöka om det 
finns skillnader som kan bero på ägarstruktur. Jag finner dock ingen sådan skillnad, oavsett 
kontroller eller instrument. 
 
Jag kommer fram till att finländska offentligt ägda bolag i genomsnitt misslyckas med att 
nå upp till könskvotens krav under alla samplets år, vilket leder till att forskningsmetodiken 
i denna avhandling misslyckas. Då bolagen inte ökar antalet kvinnor i styrelserna enligt 
kvoten, så kan resultaten från mina instrumentvariabelregressioner inte tolkas som 
kausala. Jag finner dock en positiv korrelation mellan en högre andel kvinnor i styrelser 
och kvinnlig representation bland de bäst avlönade medarbetarna i företagen. Slutligen 
diskuterar jag även varför finländska offentligt ägda bolag inte följer lagen, och kommer 
fram till att den mest sannolika orsaken är avsaknaden av straff för bolag som inte når upp 
till könskraven. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In year 2005, Finland introduced § 4a in the law on equality between women and men (Lag om 
jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män 609/1986). It states that state-owned companies are to 
have an equal representation of women and men on company boards, if there are no special 
reasons for it to be otherwise. The section thus introduced a quota, demanding state-owned 
company boards to have both genders represented. 
My empirical strategy is to conduct an instrumental variables estimation where I use the pre-
quota gender ratio as an exogenous instrument for female representation. My purpose is to find 
out how the gender composition on boards affects the female employee share and the represen-
tation of women in the top earning echelons. 
Female representation and equal opportunities have been prevalent topics in policy debate on 
equality for a long time. Issues such as: the gender pay gap, parental leave, equal opportunity 
and fair outcomes, are high up on the societal agenda in the Nordics. Public policy debate is 
often filled with discussion based on figures that are easily countered with arguments on 
selection bias, as labor market outcomes are largely determined by endogenous decisions. This 
thesis adds data-based evidence to the debate. 
Quotas mandating representation of both genders on company boards have been introduced in 
several countries, including Norway, Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, 
and Spain (Bertrand et.al. 2018). The specifics of the quotas differ from country to country, but 
the general idea behind the quotas is to increase female representation. The Finnish quota 
differs from its peers, as it only concerns state-owned companies while the quotas in the 
countries listed above concern public limited companies. 
My methodology and research design replicates Bertrand, Black, Jensen & Lleras-Muney’s 
Breaking the Glass Ceiling? The effect of board quotas on female labour outcomes in Norway 
(2018) in a Finnish context. Bertrand et. al. research a vast set of labor market outcomes, from 
which I have chosen to replicate five. Bertrand et. al.’s paper found weak and mostly 
insignificant effects from introducing a gender quota on the outcome variables that I am 
interested in. The authors therefore conclude that the quota had no meaningful effect on female 
labor market outcomes in the short to medium term. 
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2. Theory 
 
2.1 Background 
Women are, and have always been, underrepresented on company boards in Finland in 
proportion to their share of the workforce. According to the Finnish chamber of commerce 
(2019), 29 percent of board members in Finnish publicly listed companies were women in 
2019, rising from 18 percent in 2011. The disparity between men and women can exist for 
several reasons. One possibility is that women are discriminated against. A second possibility 
is that women and men make different endogenous decisions that lead to different career paths. 
A third possibility is that board appointments are made through networks, which might not 
extend to women as much as they do to men. Possibly all three, and other, explanations are 
true.  
Using a Blinder-Oaxaca method, Maczulskij & Nyblom (2020) found that there was a 13% 
discriminatory wage gap in Finland. They used a sample consisting of nearly half a million 
Finnish wage-earners; hence, the results should be robust enough to be applicable to Finnish 
companies on average. Given this information, there should be plenty room for improvement 
in female labor market outcomes in a Finnish context, likely also among state-owned 
companies.  
 
2.2 Finnish state-owned companies 
Finnish state-owned companies can be divided into three main categories: companies owned 
by the central government, companies owned by the municipalities, and companies owned by 
the Åland government. The gender quota for company boards studied in this thesis applies to 
all state-owned companies. 
2.2.1 Companies owned by the central government 
In 2004 (one year prior to the law reform), the Finnish central government had majority 
ownership in 35 companies and minority ownership in 15 (Vuoria, 2004). Furthermore, some 
of the companies had subsidiaries, which are also under the control of the Finnish central 
government by extension. An example of this is Finnair Cargo, where the state-owned Finnair 
is the ultimate, and only, owner. Therefore, the number of state-owned companies controlled 
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by the central government can vary, depending on if one includes subsidiaries or not 
(Tuominen-Thuesen, Pekkala, Sievänen, Karlsson, Ali-Yrkkö, Pajarinen & Ahonen 2019). 
Companies owned by the central government can be divided into three groups: companies that 
have financial interests, companies that exist for strategic purposes, and companies which 
complete extraordinary tasks1. In total, companies owned by the central government employ 
more than 50 000 people (Tuominen-Thuesen et. al. (2019). 
2.2.2 Companies owned by the municipalities 
Companies owned by municipalities are the largest group of Finnish state-owned companies. 
The number of municipality-owned companies has steadily risen during the last decade, and in 
2017 there were 2896 companies registered, up from less than 1100 in 2004 (Mehtonen, 2019). 
One reason for the rapid increase in municipality-owned companies is the updated legislation. 
In 2013, Finland introduced law 626/2013 (lag om ändring av kommunallagen) which forces 
municipalities to organize their activities in registered companies to a higher degree than 
before. The reasoning was that all services except those that municipalities are mandated to 
offer (such as: education, healthcare etc.) should be subject to market-based competition, which 
is allegedly easier when the services are organized by a municipality-owned company. 
Companies owned by municipalities are on average much smaller than companies controlled 
by the central government; however, they vary vastly in size, as do their purposes. Examples 
include (but are not limited to) local electricity suppliers, local phone companies, and property 
rental companies. 
2.2.3 Companies owned by the Åland government 
Due to its unique legal status and high degree of autonomy, the Åland government has the right 
to hold its own companies. In 2015, the Åland government had majority ownership in nine 
companies, and a minority share in five. Additionally, the central government has control over 
the large gambling and betting association, Penningautomatföreningen (PAF) (Ålands land-
skapsregering, 2015). 
 
 
1 More information, and a complete list of all government-owned companies, can be found on the Prime 
Minister’s Office’s webpage: https://vnk.fi/omistajaohjaus/enemmisto-vahemmisto-yhtiot 
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2.3 Legal background 
To increase the representation of women on Finnish state-owned companies’ boards, section 
4a was introduced into the Finnish law on equality between women and men in 2005. It 
specifies that women and men are to be equally represented on company boards by 01.06.2005 
if there are no special reasons for it to be otherwise. The law further specifies that every 
necessary action to achieve this should be taken up until that date (Lag om jämställdhet mellan 
kvinnor och män, 15.4.2005/232). This gave Finnish state-owned companies one and a half 
month to comply; however, many failed to do so in time. 
Even though the law fails to mention any specific percentage representation target, Finnish 
authorities have referenced to it as a 40% minimum representation of each gender. One 
example is the publication on municipality-owned companies’ boards by the ministry of social 
affairs and health (Keski-Petäjä & Katainen 2017, p. 9). The 40% representation is also 
arguably the norm in quota-legislation, as it is used in many European countries, e.g. Norway, 
Spain and France. 
The origin of the law dates to at least 16.04.2003 when the government program for 
Vanhanen’s first government was published. The program includes a section mentioning that 
the government will integrate the principle of gender equality in all administration; however, 
no specifics are mentioned (Statsrådets kansli, 2003). The original law was passed from the 
government to parliament on the 8th of October 2004 and is therefore unarguably the latest date 
on which the law has come into public knowledge. Hence, the possibility for anticipation 
effects dates to at least this date.   
 
2.4 Implications from implementing a quota 
The possible implications from implementing a quota are plenty. For my thesis, I have 
highlighted five that I deem most relevant. (i) First, the direct effect on those women who end 
up on company boards, who would otherwise not have been chosen for a board position. (ii) 
Second, the possibility of acquiring a board position creates incentives for female employees 
to work harder for promotions. (iii) Third, if board appointments are made through networks, 
having female board members will likely extend these networks to female candidates who 
would otherwise not have been considered. (iv) Fourth, female leaders might create female 
friendly business environments that fit women better, thus increasing women’s opportunities 
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for promotions and raises. (v) Fifth, the presence of women in traditionally male dominated 
areas might make men change their perception of women. 
The first implication only has direct impacts on the person chosen, who receives a desirable 
position and monetary compensation. Therefore, appointing women to boards to a higher 
degree than before unarguably increases women’s mean wages and hierarchical status, given 
that the board positions are desirable. 
The second implication is based in incentive theory from the personnel economics field and is 
often referred to as “promotion-based incentives”. The theory that effort levels are positively 
correlated with possibilities of promotion has been studied by many, e.g. Campbell (2008). 
Campbell finds that fast-food managers in areas where chances of promotions are higher extract 
significantly more effort compared to managers in other areas. I consider a position at a 
company board comparable to a promotion; therefore, it is possible that a quota increases 
exerted effort from female employees, which in turn raises their productivity and salary, even 
in cases where they are not appointed to the board in the end. 
The third implication is based on network theory, which assumes that networks are key factors 
for hiring. It also assumes that men and women have partially different networks, otherwise 
having women or men on the board would not make a difference regarding networks. Thus, 
introducing a mandatory quota could break the glass ceiling, and act as a big push which 
changes the equilibrium permanently. The network theory was pioneered by sociologist 
Granovetter (1977), who found out that networks are essential in hiring, but has also been used 
widely in economics since (e.g. Gemkov & Neugart 2011). 
The fourth implication assumes that female leaders are better at creating a female friendly 
business environment than men are. For example, strategic decisions concerning company paid 
parental leave or childcare can be measures that a board must consider, which are likely to 
affect the female labor force. The assumption that women in positions of power would use it 
for female friendly decisions is far from certain though. Bagues & Esteve-Volart (2010) studied 
a randomized experiment on hiring committees in large Spanish enterprises, where the share 
of women on the committees varied. They found out that committees with a larger share of 
women hired fewer women than committees with a smaller share of women, thus compa-
ratively preferring male candidates over female candidates. Comparable results are found in a 
similar study from Bagues, Sylos-Labini & Zinovyeva (2017). Relating to this, Brescoll (2011) 
finds out that women in positions of power voice their opinions significantly less than men in 
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similar positions. The results from these studies show that the effects from mandating female 
representation can be counter-intuitive in some cases, which adds to the topics complexity. 
The fifth assumption is based on the theory that introducing women into traditionally male 
dominated areas will change men’s perceptions of women in general. Dahl, Kotsadam & Rooth 
(2018) find interesting evidence for this in their randomized controlled trial on Norwegian 
conscripts. They find out that assigning women to squads during boot camp improves the 
perception of women among males in the treated squads, even regarding tasks that are unrelated 
to the military. For example, they find an eight percentage point increase in males answering 
“yes” to the question if it is “important to share household work equally”. This evidence 
suggests that adding women to company boards might lead to overall positive attitude changes 
toward women among male board members. Similar results are also found by Beaman, 
Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande and Topalova (2009) in their study on how exposure to female 
leaders in Indian village councils affected citizens’ perceptions of female leadership. 
Furthermore, there is a possibility that implementing a quota will have negative effects on 
female labor market outcomes. If there are not enough qualified women available, negative 
stereotypes against women might be created or reinforced when unqualified women are hired. 
Moreover, Coate & Loury (1993) find that a quota might create a “patronizing equilibrium”, 
where the affirmative action group (in my case: women) might have less incentives to acquire 
skills, due to the easier path to a board position. This might lead to less exerted effort by women 
that are considered for these positions, which might have other spillover effects such as 
reinforcing stereotypes. 
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3. Previous Research on Gender Quotas 
 
3.1 Bertrand, Black, Jensen and Lleras-Muney 
Bertrand et.al. (2018) researches what effects the Norwegian quota has had on female labor 
market outcomes, using the same instrumental variables approach as I do. The Norwegian 
quota differs from the Finnish in several aspects, mostly by applying to public limited 
companies (allmenaksjeselskap, “ASA”). It was written into law in 2003; however, most 
companies failed to comply at first. Therefore, the Norwegian law was amended in 2005 with 
a section stating that companies who failed to comply with the 40% representation requirement 
risked facing forced dissolution. In year 2008, compliance was close to full, which assured a 
strong first stage for their analysis. Bertrand et.al. (2018) researches many more labor market 
outcomes than I do. First, they find out that the newly appointed women were at least as 
qualified as their male peers on average, based on observational characteristics. Second, they 
find out that the average earnings for newly appointed female board members rise significantly 
as a result of an appointment. Third, they research how female labor market outcomes inside 
treated companies change based on the gender composition of boards, which is what I research 
in my thesis. 
Bertrand et.al. (2018) divide their analysis into business groups and company-level models due 
to the complexity of ownership structure in Norwegian companies. Additionally, they perform 
the analysis on so called “intent-to-treat” companies to check the robustness of their results. 
“Intent-to-treat” companies are companies that changed their legal status away from public 
companies when the law was changed. According to the authors, there were a substantial 
amount of such re-registrations in connection to the law reform. 
Bertrand et.al. (2018, table 6) find out that most results were statistically insignificant and 
small. All outcomes that I replicate, except share of women among top 25 percent of earners 
yield insignificant results, and the result for the only significant coefficient is negative. That is, 
adding women to boards reduced the share of women among top 25 percent of earners. 
Bertrand et.al. conclude that the quota had little to no effect on female labor market outcomes 
in Norwegian public limited (ASA) companies. 
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3.2 Other previous research on gender quotas 
Matsa and Miller (2013) studies the Norwegian quota’s impact on labor costs and employment 
levels in Norwegian companies, using a difference-in-differences approach comparing 
Norwegian companies with their Swedish, Danish and Finnish peers. They found out that 
companies which had few or no female board members pre-quota saw a 4,1% increase in labor 
costs and a significant reduction in short-term profits, post-quota. They argue that the increase 
in costs is due to differences in female and male leadership. Matsa and Miller do not distinguish 
whether the increase in labor costs originate from increased male, female, or overall wages, 
nor if it is the result of avoided lay-offs.  
Other studies have researched the effect of gender quotas on financial targets (e.g. Reguera-
Alvardo et.al. 2017 in a Spanish context). There are also several studies researching how 
diversity in company boards affect financial targets (such as: Carter et.al. 2008 in Oklahoma). 
However, I am yet to find another study (except Bertrand et.al. (2018)) that researches a gender 
quota’s effect on female labor outcomes. To my knowledge, there has also not been any 
empirical research on how gender quotas affect female labor market outcomes in a Finnish 
context prior to this thesis. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
 
4.1 Methodology 
The main empirical strategy of this thesis is to run instrumental variables regressions for all 
outcome variables. The treatment variable is the board’s gender ratio, which is instrumented 
for by the pre-reform gender ratio interacted with year dummies. The main assumption is that 
the law reform affects companies with a low share of female board members more than 
companies with a high share of female board members, as companies with a low share have to 
make larger changes in board structure compared to companies with a high share pre-reform. 
This asymmetrical increase is crucial for the research design to work as intended, as the 
difference in increase is utilized to analyze the effect of the treatment. Furthermore, I cap the 
maximal “bite” of the reform to 40%. In other words, the maximum effect the reform can have 
on a board composition is an increase of 40 percentage points, as any change that increases the 
share of women to over 40% is voluntary. Even though the Finnish reform fails to mention any 
specific share of women required, I choose to use 40% as my threshold, as at least one Finnish 
ministry refers to it (Keski-Petäjä & Katainen 2017, p. 9), and it is the norm in European quota-
legislation. The methodology is identical to Bertrand et.al. (2018), and therefore allows me to 
make direct comparisons between my results and theirs. 
My main regressions use the gender composition on boards in 2004 to instrument the treatment. 
Year 2004 is one year prior to the reform and should provide the best instrument assuming 
there are no meaningful anticipation effects. Such anticipation effects could be that companies 
which need to appoint new board members in the years prior to the reform take the reform into 
account in their hiring process. Therefore, they would be more likely to employ a woman over 
a man, even though the reform had not been written into law at that point in time. I also run 
regressions using the 2003 and 2005 board gender composition as instruments to allow for 
deeper analysis of possible anticipation effects. 
Furthermore, I choose to run reduced form estimates on yearly interaction dummies to get a 
better understanding of my results. This enables me to analyze the effects of the treatment on 
a year-to-year basis, which can be interesting, given that the effects might for example be 
lagged. Moreover, this approach allows me to plot event study graphs, which visualize the 
results clearly. Additionally, I run reduced form regressions on a post-treatment dummy, 
effectively providing the average result from the interaction dummies. Reduced form estimates 
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are interesting because they include all effects of the reform, regardless of the channel. There 
is a possibility that the reform affected female labor market outcomes through other channels 
than the treatment (the board gender composition), which will be reflected in the reduced form 
estimates but would not be seen in the main regression results. For example, it could be possible 
that the law reform created awareness toward female labor market outcomes, which made 
companies with a low share of women on their board increase salaries for women relatively 
more than companies that had high representation of women on their board pre-law. In that 
case, the law reform has impacted the measured outcomes, albeit not through the obvious 
channel (by increasing the share of female board members). Conversely, if there is no impact 
in the reduced form estimates, any effect of the treatment likely is not there.  
To analyze the viability of my instrumental variables approach, I choose to run and report first-
stage regressions, which show how the pre-treatment board gender composition affected how 
the share of women on company boards increased on average. Furthermore, I plot the first-
stage results in an event-study style graph, to see if there were any significant pre-trends that 
must be accounted for. Additionally, I report the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics to analyze 
whether there is enough variation within the sample to ensure the viability of my approach. 
I also run OLS-regressions on all outcome variables to see if there are any meaningful corre-
lations between the treatment and outcomes. A high correlation would indicate that the 
possibility of a causal effect is higher; however, even if the correlation is low, a causal effect 
is not ruled out entirely. An example of the latter could be a scenario where companies with a 
high share of women on the board are less likely to score high on the outcome variables, while 
an increase in the share of women on the board would still lead to improvements in the outcome 
variables. 
Additionally, I choose to run all regressions on a limited sample consisting of only government-
owned companies, as they are different from municipality-owned companies in many aspects. 
I limit the sample in this way to see if there are any differences between how the different forms 
of state-owned companies reacted to the law reform. 
I choose to include state-owned companies’ subsidiaries in my sample. The subsidiaries are 
equally affected by the quota and must therefore also adjust their board gender composition 
accordingly.  
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4.2 Data 
My data is from Statistics Finland and includes micro-level registry data. This allows me to 
identify what company an individual has worked for during a given year. Furthermore, I can 
obtain information about the individual’s salary, educational status, marriage status, number of 
children, age and more2. Additionally, I have access to the Finnish Patent and Registration 
database on all registered companies’ board compositions. By combining these datasets, I can 
calculate the share of women in different income percentiles inside a given company at a given 
year and identify the gender composition of a company’s board for each year. I choose to use 
a dataset from 1997-2017, which allows me to analyze the effects twelve years post reform and 
the pre trends eight years prior to the reform, which I argue is long enough for a relevant pre 
trend analysis. For a company to be included in the regressions, it needs to have a registered 
board in the instrumented year, which is 2004 in my main model. The number of municipality-
owned companies have more than doubled since 2004; hence, the number of observations 
might seem low when comparing to today’s company numbers but is nevertheless sufficiently 
large for this study. 
Appendix table A1 provides a list of control variables that are used in the main regressions 
with time-varying controls. Compared to Bertrand et.al. (2018), I lack controls for the share of 
employees in twenty different industry categories, as I am not able to identify different industry 
categories inside a given company. Instead, I control for the company-level industry category 
by using the two-digit level TOL02 codes provided by statistics Finland. Moreover, I am also 
unable to identify the share of employees with MBA degrees, as MBAs are not distinguished 
from other tertiary education in the statistics Finland dataset. However, all other controls are 
provided and controlled for. 
For a deeper understanding of the data, appendix tables A4-A8 provide summary statistics for 
the sample.  
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
All descriptive graphs and tables are based on the sample that is used for the regressions. Hence, 
all companies that did not exist in 2004 are omitted. Figures one and two below visualize the 
gender disparity in income in Finnish state-owned companies from 1994-2017. The gap is 
 
2 The full set of control variables that I use in my regressions can be found in the appendix table A1 
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significant and persistent during the timeframe, both regarding the mean and the 90th percentile. 
The pattern very closely resembles what Bertrand et.al. present in their paper (2018, p. 199).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Mean earnings by gender 
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Figure three visualizes the average share of women on company boards in state-owned 
companies from 1994-2017. The figure shows that state-owned companies fail to comply with 
equal representation on boards during the whole timeframe on average, even if they do maintain 
an upward sloping trend. The implications of this is discussed more thoroughly under the 
limitations sub-chapter. Companies are weighted equally in figure 3, while they are weighted 
on employee count in the regressions. This fact is important in understanding the setting, as my 
data shows that government-owned companies had on average 430 employees in 2004, while 
the equivalent number is 19.3 for municipality owned companies.  
Companies owned by the Åland government are omitted from figures 3-5 because there are so 
few of them that it would be possible to identify single companies from the trend, which is 
against the rules set by statistics Finland. 
 
Figure 2 - 90th percentile of earnings by gender 
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Figure four plots companies in different quintiles by female board member share in 2004 and 
2014. The figure shows that the share of companies with very few women on their board (0 – 
20 %) has decreased significantly among government-owned companies but stayed relatively 
steady among municipality-owned companies. As the median board size in 2004 were five and 
four respectively, companies in the first quintile had zero female board members, while most 
companies in the second quintile had one female board member, and so on. However, if the 
board had six or more members, which became the norm in 2014, the company is placed in the 
first quintile if they had one woman on their board, which explains the relatively high share of 
companies in the first quintile in 20143. 
The figure also shows that many companies still did not comply in 2014, even though the 
average share of women on boards increased. Figure four also shows that there are companies 
where the share of men on company boards is too low. The quota specifies that there should be 
an equal representation of both men and women; hence, companies with a too high share of 
female board members need to reduce the share of women on company boards to comply with 
the quota. In figure four, these companies are represented in the last quintile. If the share of 
companies with this opposite situation would be high, it would invalidate my methodology, as 
 
3 See appendix tables A4-A8 for more thorough statistics. 
Figure 3 - Sex ratio on state-owned company boards in Finland 
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I assume the quota would only increase the share of women on company boards. However, the 
number of companies which need to reduce their share of women is low enough for me to argue 
that it is irrelevant for this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 4 - State-owned Companies per Quintile Female Board Members 
 
Figure five plots the share of companies by the number of female board members in 2004 and 
2014. Unsurprisingly, the trend is very similar to figure 4, which plots the share of female board 
members instead of absolute numbers. The figure shows that nine years after the imple-
mentation of the board quota, there is a large drop in the share of companies with 0 female 
board members; however, compliance is far from full.  
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Figure 5 - Number of women on company boards 
 
Figure six plots a time-series which is similar to figure three, but instead of dividing companies 
into government-owned and municipality-owned, it plots them per bite-level. Figure five 
shows that companies with a full bite (i.e. zero women on the board in 2004) increase their 
share of women on boards more than their peers with lower bites, which is a requirement for 
the research design to work. However, some part of this faster increase is likely due to so called 
“mean reversion”, as companies with 0 women were outliers to begin with. Moreover, 
companies with a high bite do not increase their share of women on boards significantly more 
or faster than companies with a low bite, indicating that the law reform might not have the 
asymmetrical effect it needs to have in order for the research design to work as intended. 
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Figure 6 - Share of Women on Company Boards per Bite-level 
 
 
4.3 Limitations 
Just as Bertrand et.al. (2018, p. 216) does, I identify the possibility that companies with a 
different share of women on boards were also different in “female friendliness” pre reform, 
differing in working conditions for women. If companies with a higher share of female board 
members pre reform were more “female friendly” in working conditions, it might attenuate my 
effects. The rationale is that the efforts to improve working conditions for women that are 
unrelated to the gender composition of the board, are impossible to control for in the 
regressions. Hence, my estimates would violate the exogeneity assumption, as the treatment 
would not be randomly distributed. A violation of the exogeneity assumption can bias the 
results in any direction, depending on how the bias acts. An intuitive example would be that 
companies with a large female representation on company boards prior to the quota, would also 
be more likely to have implemented reforms that improve female labor market outcomes over 
time, already before the quota. Therefore, the results would be downward-biased, as the female 
labor market outcomes improve due to previous measures taken, without an increase in the 
female board member share. 
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I also identify the risk for a violation of the exclusion restriction, especially concerning the 
regressions on the number of women among top five earners and in the 95th percentile. The law 
reform created a need to employ more women to company boards, and I see a possibility that 
some of these women were employed by the company before the reform. Being a board 
member is often a desirable position, thus it is not unlikely that the women chosen were among 
the best earners inside the organization pre-quota. If that is the case, the instrument has directly 
affected the outcome variable by removing high earners from the organization, hence biasing 
the estimates negatively. 
The Finnish reform was written into law in June 2005. Therefore, I have chosen 2004 as the 
baseline year for my instrument. It is possible that choosing the year so close to the reform 
biases my estimates negatively, as it might ignore anticipation effects. The reform was publicly 
known well before the actual date, as it was prepared and discussed in parliament, which means 
that some companies might have taken it into account already before the reform was written 
into law. Companies that needed to appoint new board members in 2004 might for example 
have chosen a woman instead of a man, because they knew that they had to comply to the new 
reform in a later stage. If that is the case, my results are underestimated. 
There is an evident and likely risk that many of my time-varying control variables are 
endogenous. Bertrand et.al. (2018) notes this in their paper, but argues that their results are 
interesting, nonetheless. Control variables such as: share of employees with a graduate degree 
that are women, are likely to be affected by the treatment, which makes them endogenous. In 
Bertrand et. al. (2018)’s case, the estimates are consistent regardless if the controls are included 
or not, therefore they act as a robustness check which validates the results. One option to 
overcome the endogeneity problem could be to use the pre-reform numbers for the supposedly 
endogenous variables. That would eliminate the concern for endogeneity, but also reduce the 
impact of the controls, as they would not be time varying. This method is discussed by Deuchert 
and Huber in their paper on control variables in IV-estimation (2014). 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 First stage and F-statistics 
The first stage regressions presented in table 1 find positive, but mostly insignificant and small 
results, indicating weak instruments. The results suggest that Finnish state-owned companies 
with few women on the board pre-quota did not increase their share of female board members 
significantly more than Finnish state-owned companies with many women on the board pre-
quota. The insignificant first stage has negative implications for a potential causal interpretation 
of the main regressions, as a strong first stage is a requirement for the viability of instrumental 
variables regressions.  
The effect of the treatment is understood by multiplying the results in the table by the bite of 
the reform. The bite of the reform is defined as:  
Bite = (0,4 - percentage women on board in 2004); Bite ≥ 0 
The following example is intended to clarify:  
If the hypothetical company X had a female board member share of 0% in 2004, they have a 
bite of 0.4. If one is interested in how the quota affected company X’s board gender 
composition in 2010, one multiplies the coefficient (Table 1, column 1, row 2010), which is 
0.299, with 0.4, and receives 0.1196. Hence, company X (and other companies with 0 women 
on their board in 2004) have experienced a 11.96 percentage point increase in female board 
members by 2010, on average. 
My main regression (table 1, column 1) only scores a 3.629 F-statistic, which is low. The 
general target is that F-statistics below 10 indicate that instruments are weak. The 
corresponding F-statistics for all other columns are also low, meaning that none of the 
alternative instruments work better, nor does limiting the sample to only government-owned 
companies.  
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TABLE 1 
First-stage regressions 
Dependent variable: Percentage women on board 
Instrument Year 2004 2003 2005 2004 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percent women on board in    
2005 0.127 0.148 -0.335*** 0.113 
 (0.181) (0.163) (0.0645) (0.230) 
2006 -0.0766 0.00919 -0.379*** -0.168 
 (0.142) (0.125) (0.0940) (0.172) 
2007 0.214* 0.301*** -0.143 0.166 
 (0.122) (0.0899) (0.144) (0.151) 
2008 0.292** 0.375*** -0.0674 0.252* 
 (0.122) (0.0923) (0.151) (0.150) 
2009 0.189 0.192 -0.121 0.120 
 (0.132) (0.117) (0.133) (0.161) 
2010 0.299 0.179 -0.0575 0.228 
 (0.189) (0.113) (0.140) (0.221) 
2011 0.339* 0.279** -0.0883 0.248 
 (0.190) (0.132) (0.187) (0.228) 
2012 0.314 0.0856 -0.108 0.195 
 (0.243) (0.246) (0.157) (0.297) 
2013 0.605** 0.159 0.0733 0.495 
 (0.297) (0.278) (0.151) (0.357) 
2014 0.409 0.437 -0.222 0.175 
 (0.319) (0.414) (0.300) (0.397) 
2015 0.413 0.563 -0.0985 0.186 
 (0.272) (0.430) (0.327) (0.350) 
2016 0.281 0.271 -0.184 -0.00363 
 (0.337) (0.609) (0.283) (0.438) 
2017 0.430 0.462 -0.191 0.188 
 (0.270) (0.352) (0.294) (0.338) 
Year and company 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instrument year 2004 2003 2005 2004 
Only government-
owned companies 
No No No Yes 
F-Statistic 3.629 3.916 4.679 4.192 
Observations 5 383 4 980 6 941 1 007 
Notes: Standard errors clustered on company level in parentheses. F-statistics 
used are Kleibergen-Paap due to the heterogeneity in the sample. All regressions 
are weighted on company employee count. Standard errors are clustered on the 
company level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
 
Even though the results are weak across the board, the first stage is arguably strongest in the 
main regression, column 1, which suggests that using the 2004 gender board composition as 
an instrument is the right choice. The weak first stage in column 4 (only government-owned 
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companies) is somewhat surprising, considering figures 3-5, which show that government-
owned companies have increased their female board member share much more than 
municipality-owned companies. It is therefore evident that government-owned companies have 
not increased their share of female board members asymmetrically, which would be needed for 
a strong first stage to occur. 
 
 
Figure 7 - First Stage Plotted as an Event Study 
Once plotted as an event study, the insignificant first stage is visualized. When comparing the 
pre- and post-periods, there are no clear differences in trends, which would be necessary for a 
significant first stage to exist. Figure 7 therefore confirms that the first stage is too weak for 
any causal interpretation of the instrumental variable regression results (which are presented 
in table 2).  
 
5.2 Reduced Form 
The reduced form results are presented in appendix table A3. All results are read the same way 
as in table 1, i.e. by multiplying the coefficients with the corresponding bite. Hence, the highest 
possible effect is the coefficient multiplied by 0.4 (the maximal bite). The results in table A3 
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are all insignificant, and some are negative. The results indicate that the quota had no positive 
effects on female labor market outcomes, regardless of channel.  
I have visualized the reduced form estimates on a year-to-year basis in figures 8-12. The 
vertical line indicates the omitted year 2004, which was chosen as the instrument. The purpose 
of the figures is to visualize and compare the pre-trends to the post-trends. 
 
 
Figure 8 - Female Employee Share 
 
23 
 
 
Figure 9 - Women Among Top Five Earners (Number) 
 
 
Figure 10 - Women Among Top 25% of Earners 
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Figure 11 - Women Among Top 10% of Earners 
 
 
Figure 12 - Women Among Top 5% of Earners 
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None of figures 8-12 show significant changes in the outcome variables. All pre-trends are 
similar to the respective post-trends, implying that the law reform had no effect on the measured 
female labor market outcomes. 
Figure 8 plots a negative trend, which implies that companies with a low share of female board 
members in 2004 have fared relatively worse in increasing the female employee share both 
before and after 2004, when compared to companies with a high share of female board 
members in 2004. The estimates are relatively precise, considering figure 8’s small confidence 
intervals compared to the other figures.  
Figures 9-12 plot consistent, horizontal trends. However, the confidence intervals are all 
relatively large, which means that we cannot discard the possibility of meaningful changes in 
pre- and post-trends. Although, given how consistent the trends are across years and outcome 
variables, it is unlikely that there would be any causal effect even if the model would plot more 
precise estimates, especially considering that the outcome variables are likely to be correlated 
to a high degree. 
Figure 9 differs from the other figures in that the y-axis shows absolute values, not percentages. 
Hence, the figure plots how the reform affected the number of women among top 5 earners, 
not the share of women among top 5 earners. 
The reduced form results in appendix table A4 together with figures 7-11 show that the reform 
is unlikely to have had any effect on the measured female labor market outcomes, regardless 
of channel. 
 
5.3 Main table  
My main results are presented in table 2 below. The table shows results in five outcome 
variables using three different years as instruments. Panel A shows my main regressions using 
the 2004 gender composition on boards interacted with year dummies as instruments. The odd 
columns in panel A do not include time-varying company controls, while the even-numbered 
columns do. Panel B shows alternative regressions which use the 2003 and 2005 gender 
composition on boards as instruments. 
Like in all previous tables, the table is understood by multiplying the coefficients by the bite 
the companies faced in the instrumented year.  
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Table 2 
Effect of board gender quota on female outcomes in Finnish state-owned companies. Instrumental variables regressions 
 
Panel A: Main Regressions 
Dependent Variable Female Employee share 
Share of female employees with earning above 
 the … in the earnings distribution 
Number of women among 
top 5 earners 
 75th percentile 90th percentile 95th percentile  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Percent women on board in year t -0.0937 0.135* 0.173 0.124 -0.180 -0.156 -0.152 -0.200 -1.379 -0.162 
(0.153) (0.0698) (0.175) (0.124) (0.177) (0.163) (0.194) (0.180) (1.988) (1.873) 
Time-varying company controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Instrument year 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
Observations 4,893 4,893 4,893 4,893 4,893 4,893 4,893 4,893 4,893 4,893 
R2 -0.040 0.511 0.042 0.152 0.010 0.055 -0.010 -0.005 -0.119 0.110 
 
Panel B: Alternative Instruments 
Dependent Variable Female Employee share 
Share of female employees with earning above 
 the … in the earnings distribution 
Number of women among 
top 5 earners 
   75th percentile 90th percentile 95th percentile   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Percent women on board in year t 0.0452 -0.0616 0.130 0.0894 0.00638 0.0361 0.0672 0.0108 -0.163 -1.652 
(0.110) (0.0708) (0.174) (0.0992) (0.155) (0.151) (0.223) (0.148) (1.473) (1.841) 
Time-varying company controls No No No No No No No No No No 
Instrument year 2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005 
Observations 4,549 6,459 4,549 6,459 4,549 6,459 4,549 6,459 4,549 6,459 
R2 0.119 -0.000 0.095 0.094 0.037 0.027 -0.005 0.010 0.001 -0.170 
Notes: Estimates are based on a sample containing data from Finnish state-owned companies from 2005-2017. All regressions include company fixed effects, year fixed effects, and controls 
for company-specific industry categories. Time-varying company controls are listed in the appendix table A1. Observations in all columns are weighted on the number of workers in each 
company. Table 1 reports the first-stage regressions. Results for regressions including only government-owned companies are presented in appendix table A8.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on the company level 
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I consistently find insignificant results across all outcome variables in all regressions. My 
results do not differ significantly when using different instruments; hence, any meaningful 
anticipation effects can likely be ruled out. Moreover, the low F-statistics and the weak first 
stage indicate that my instruments are too weak for any causal interpretation of my findings. 
Therefore, the numbers in the table are more suggestive than definite.  
Results for regressions with a sample limited to only government-owned companies are 
presented in appendix table A8. Limiting the sample to government-owned companies does 
not yield any meaningful changes in outcomes. All results stay insignificant, and considering 
the weak first stage, they do not provide any causal results either. 
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6. Discussion 
 
6.1 Comparison to Bertrand et. al. (2018)  
Given the large similarities between this thesis and Bertrand et.al. (2018), there would be strong 
grounds for direct comparisons between the results if my research design would work as 
intended. However, the weak first stage and the low F-statistics prove that the instruments used 
are not viable in this context. Consequently, no direct result comparisons can be made. The 
main table in my thesis cannot provide any causal results, while the Norwegian counterpart 
can. 
The reasons for the failed research design in Finland are low compliance with the law, and the 
absence of an asymmetrical increase in female board members among companies of different 
bite-levels. In contrast, Norwegian companies comply to a very high degree. The average share 
of women on company boards during the post 2008 period (when the Norwegian quota had 
legal consequences) is very close to 40% among all companies, regardless of the pre-quota 
gender ratio (Bertrand et.al. 2018, p.234, column 6). In comparison, Finnish state-owned 
companies fail to reach 40% on average in every year. Moreover, there is no significant 
difference in increase in the share of women on company boards when comparing companies 
with different pre-quota gender ratios on their boards. An asymmetrical increase would be 
essential for my instruments to work as intended. 
Adding to the paragraph above, Ahern & Dittmar (2012) find out that Norwegian companies 
that had a low share of women before the quota were more likely to change their legal status 
away from public limited companies, presumably to avoid the quota. Furthermore, new 
companies registered as private limited companies to a higher degree compared to public 
limited companies during the post quota period. Given this information, the first stage in 
Bertrand et.al. (2018) might be weaker than presented if one would account for companies 
changing their legal status and new entrants; however, it is impossible to find conclusive 
evidence that companies changed their legal status due to the quota, and not for any other 
reason, even though it is very likely. Regardless, Bertrand et.al.’s study finds relevant results 
that can be applied to those companies who did not change their legal status. Finnish state-
owned companies do not have the option to change their legal status in order to avoid the quota; 
thus, it is of no concern for this thesis.  
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6.2 Non-compliance 
The most straightforward possible reason for non-compliance with the quota, is that there are 
no written legal consequences for Finnish state-owned companies if they fail to comply. 
Similarly, Norwegian ASA companies did not comply in large scale until they were threatened 
by forced dissolution. Though the legal form is different, I still find it possible that Finnish 
companies did not comply because there were no sanctions. I identify the possibility that 
persons in charge of board appointments ignore the law, because they prefer the status quo for 
any given reason, or value the expected returns from appointing a man over a woman higher 
than the risk of repercussions. 
A further possible reason to why companies did not comply could be that there actually were 
special reasons for it to be otherwise, as stated in the law as the only reason for not complying. 
The Finnish law’s vague wording allows for a smaller share of women, without further speci-
fying what these reasons may be, and could hence play an important role in explaining the non-
compliance.  
Most of the studied municipality-owned companies are small and have few employees. Many 
are also based in rural municipalities. I find it plausible that there in many cases were not 
enough qualified women applying for board positions in such companies, as they might neither 
be attractive nor lucrative positions, for example in comparison to Norwegian ASA companies. 
If there are not enough qualified women interested in the board positions, that might be a 
special reason for it to be otherwise, and therefore explain the non-compliance. However, 
while this reasoning could perhaps explain some of the non-compliance among small 
municipality-owned companies, it does not explain why companies owned by the central 
government do not. I do not consider it plausible that there would not be enough qualified 
women applying for these positions, as they are most likely lucrative and attractive positions. 
Furthermore, Bertrand et.al. (2018) find out that women hired on company boards on 
Norwegian ASA-companies post-quota were more qualified than their male peers based on 
observable characteristics. I find it unlikely that there would be significantly less qualified 
women in Finland given the cultural- and demographic similarities between the nations. 
Nevertheless, the fact that there would be a distinct lack of qualified women for the positions 
is a possibility and should be accounted for until further research on that specific question has 
been made. 
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I also do not discard the possibility that some people in charge of appointing board members 
were not aware of the quota during the studied timeframe. Based on google searches and news 
articles published closed to the law’s date, I conclude that the quota was likely not a topic of 
larger national debate. Hence, it is possible that many companies were, and possibly still are, 
unaware of the quota. I find this hypothesis more likely for small municipality-owned 
companies in comparison to large companies owned by the central government, as the 
resources available and the level of governance differ much between the two different 
ownership structures. 
Another possibility for the non-compliance could be that Finnish state-owned companies 
interpret the term equally represented differently than I do. Regarding quotas, a 40% minimum 
representation is generally considered the norm. However, it is possible that Finnish state-
owned companies might e.g. consider a board where both genders are represented an equal 
representation, regardless of the ratio. To my knowledge, Finnish courts have not tried the 
clause specifying the quota. Hereby, it is possible that alternative understandings of equal 
representation are the reason for the perceived non-compliance. However, even though this 
explanation may carry some weight, the fact that at least one of Finland’s ministries refer to a 
40% representation as the guideline debunks this hypothesis to some extent (Keski-Petäjä & 
Katainen 2017, p. 9). 
 
6.3 Research design 
The non-compliance among Finnish state-owned companies has strong implications for the 
analysis of my results. Companies who comply to a higher degree might potentially differ from 
companies who comply to a lesser degree in several aspects. It is possible that companies that 
have undertaken “pro-female actions” (such as e.g. improving parental leave conditions, or 
other measures which comparatively would benefit female employees) complied to a higher 
degree, which would mean that my results are local treatment effects for companies who 
comply, and over-estimated if they would be applied to the whole sample. The rationale in this 
hypothetical scenario is that companies that undertake other “pro-female actions” would be 
more likely to employ women as board members. The reverse correlation is also possible, i.e. 
companies who comply to a higher degree have already undertaken other “pro-female actions”, 
and therefore have less room to improve. If that is the case, the results would be under-
estimated.  
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The reasoning above may seem counter-intuitive to the reasoning provided in the limitations 
sub-chapter, where I explained that one possible threat to my model is that companies who are 
more “pro-female” would have more female directors in 2004 and thus less room to improve; 
therefore, understating the effect and violating the exogeneity restriction. The two are not 
mutually exclusive, however. It is possible that companies that were more “pro-female” in 
2004 had a larger share of female board members and made faster progress in the outcomes 
measured, while also complying to the quota to a higher degree. 
My methodology might violate the exclusion restriction, as discussed under the limitations sub-
chapter. It is possible that companies are more prone to appoint their own female employees to 
their board, compared to the rest of the workforce. In that case, the exclusion restriction would 
be violated, and the estimates would be biased downward, given that the women would be 
among the top earners in the companies. Whether or not this happens could be analyzed by 
researching how likely a new board member is to have worked in the same company right 
before the appointment. I have elected not to do that research in this thesis, as it would have 
little to no implications for my conclusions, given the weak instruments which disregard any 
causal interpretations regardless. 
 
6.4 Weak instruments 
The low F-statistics combined with the weak first stage show that my instrumental variables 
approach is not the right research design to study the impact of the Finnish gender quota on 
female labor market outcomes. To be viable, the instruments would have to be stronger. 
Therefore, my results neither prove nor disprove the hypothesis that gender quotas would 
improve female labor market outcomes. My results can, however, be interpreted as evidence 
that Finnish state-owned companies did not comply with the law in each year between 2005-
2017 on average. 
Moreover, my results also show that state-owned companies with few women on the board in 
2004 did not increase their share of women significantly more than their peers with more 
women on the board in 2004, which is the main factor to invalidate my research design. Even 
if compliance would not have been total, the approach could have yielded interesting results if 
companies with a low share of women pre-quota increased their share of women relatively and 
significantly more than companies with a high share of women pre-quota. For further research, 
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alternative instruments or an alternative approach needs to be used for a causal interpretation 
of a quota’s effect on female labor market outcomes in Finnish state-owned companies. 
The two paragraphs above may seem contradicting to figure 3, which shows a clear increase in 
female board membership among government-owned companies. However, even though 
figure 3 shows that companies did increase their average share of female board members during 
the timeframe, it means that the increase was not asymmetric in the way that would be essential 
for my research design. Instead, companies with a larger share of female board members pre-
quota increased the share of female board members by approximately as much as companies 
with a low share of female board members pre-quota, which is also supported by figures 6 and 
7. Moreover, figure 3 weighs every company equally, while the regressions are weighted on 
the number of employees in each company. 
 
6.5 Further research and relevance 
My thesis provides evidence for, that during 2005-2017 many Finnish state-owned companies 
did not comply with the board quota which came into law in 2004. Therefore, the board quota 
has been inefficient in reaching its main purpose: increasing the share of women on company 
boards. 
My thesis focuses on whether the quota has improved female labor market outcomes but does 
not come to any conclusive evidence due to non-compliance by the state-owned companies. 
However, improving female labor market outcomes is not necessarily the main objective 
behind the quota. A quota might for example have symbolic value, which might be enough to 
justify its existence.  
The OLS-regressions (listed in appendix table A2) show positive, albeit imprecise, correlations 
between the outcome variables and female board member share when company-fixed effects 
are removed, which I argue is almost a necessary condition for a quota to have positive effects 
on the measured outcomes. If there would be no such correlation, any positive effect could 
theoretically exist; however, it would mean that women are appointed to boards in companies 
where females perform comparatively worse, which although possible, I deem unlikely. 
Therefore, I argue that there is a possibility that a quota could have a positive impact on female 
labor market outcomes in Finnish state-owned companies, given that companies would comply 
to a high degree. 
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Since the research design in this thesis failed, an alternative approach to research the impact of 
the quota is needed. One viable alternative could be to perform a propensity score matching 
difference-in-differences study, pairing state-owned companies that increased their share of 
female board members significantly to other state-owned companies which are alike in 
observable characteristics, but for some reasons did not increase their share of female board 
members. Such an approach could possibly filter out some of the endogeneity behind the 
decision to increase the share of female board members and provide interesting data to the 
discussion. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
I conclude that the Finnish gender quota for state-owned companies has not had any positive 
effects on the measured female labor market outcomes. During the timeframe, the quota has 
been ineffective not only in improving female labor market outcomes, but also in increasing 
the share of women on company boards. Even though the share of female board members in 
Finnish state-owned companies has increased during the studied timeframe, figures 3-6 show 
that the increase could just as well had happened without the quota, as the pre-trends were 
positive, and many companies still had zero women on their board nine years after the quota 
was implemented.  
I also conclude that the results ultimately follow the pattern of previous literature in that the 
gender quota was proven ineffective in improving female labor market outcomes; however, in 
comparison to the previous literature, my conclusion does not stem from the idea that the 
gender quota is an inefficient tool. Instead, my results found out that Finnish state-owned 
companies failed to comply with the gender quota; hence, the quota had no effect. Furthermore, 
I proved that the quota did not improve female labor market outcomes through other channels 
than raising the share of female board members in my reduced form results. Companies with a 
low share of female board members in 2004 did not improve their female labor market 
outcomes relatively more than companies with a higher share of female board members in 
2004. 
Additionally, I conclude that there is a possibility that a gender quota benefits female labor 
market outcomes in Finland. This thesis can neither provide evidence toward, nor can it debunk 
the hypothesis that a quota would be beneficial. Therefore, a gender quota might be a relevant 
policy tool to improve female labor market outcomes in Finland, given that companies would 
comply. 
Lastly, I conclude that there is a possibility that the gender quota has had other effects which 
are not captured by this study. It is in no way certain that improving female labor market 
outcomes was the only objective of the quota; therefore, I take no stance in the overall success 
of the quota besides noting that it has not reached its main objective: equal representation. For 
example, it is possible that the symbolic value of equal representation on paper, or any other 
positive effect the quota might have, is enough to justify the quota’s existence.  
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9. Appendix 
 
 
 
TABLE A1 
List of control variables 
Time-varying control variables 
Employee average age 
Share of employees with upper secondary education  
Share of employees with undergraduate education 
Share of employees with postgraduate education 
Share of employees with doctoral degrees 
Share of employees that are married 
Share of employees that have children 
Share of employees with upper secondary education that are women 
Share of employees with undergraduate education that are women 
Share of employees with postgraduate education that are women 
Share of employees with doctoral degrees that are women 
Share of employees that are married that are women 
Share of employees that have children that are women 
 
General Controls 
Company industry category 
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Table A2 
Correlations between the share of women on company boards and the outcome variables 
 
Panel A: OLS regressions with company fixed effects 
Dependent Variable 
Female Employee 
share 
Share of female employees with earning above 
 the … in the earnings distribution 
Number of women 
among top 5 earners 
 75th percentile 90th percentile 95th percentile  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Percent women on board in year t 0.118*** 0.104*** -0.0194 -0.0427 -0.0491 -0.0798 -0.0251 -0.0359 0.737* 0.454 
(0.0322) (0.0324) (0.0555) (0.0627) (0.0395) (0.0484) (0.0435) (0.0568) (0.435) (0.503) 
Only government-owned companies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time-varying company controls No No No No No No No No No No 
Company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4 933 889 4 933 889 4 933 889 4 933 889 4 933 889 
R2 0.943 0.704 0.923 0.949 0.850 0.890 0.735 0.769 0.711 0.704 
 
Panel B: OLS regressions without company fixed effects 
Dependent Variable 
Female Employee 
share 
Share of female employees with earning above 
 the … in the earnings distribution 
Number of women 
among top 5 earners 
   75th percentile 90th percentile 95th percentile   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Percent women on board in year t 0.189*** 0.250*** 0.0563 0.0590 0.0553 0.0388 0.0720 0.0597 0.606** 0.506 
(0.0512) (0.0713) (0.0577) (0.0834) (0.0568) (0.0841) (0.0505) (0.0721) (0.297) (0.393) 
Only government-owned companies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time-varying company controls No No No No No No No No No No 
Company fixed effects No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 4,964 903 4,964 903 4,964 903 903 903 4,964 903 
R2 0.754 0.804 0.696 0.756 0.610 0.689 0.595 0.595 0.551 0.617 
Notes: Estimates are based on a sample containing data from Finnish state-owned companies from 2004-2017. All regressions include year fixed effects and controls 
for company-specific industry categories. Time-varying company controls are listed in the appendix table A1. Observations in all columns are weighted on the number 
of workers in each company. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on the company level 
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Table A3 
Reduced Form Estimates 
 
Reduced Form Estimates 
Dependent Variable Female Employee share 
Share of female employees with earning above 
 the … in the earnings distribution 
Number of women among 
top 5 earners 
 75th percentile 90th percentile 95th percentile  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Bite 
-0.0154 -0.0385 0.0443 0.0180 -0.0111 -0.0515 -0.0181 -0.0661 -0.0371 -0.357 
(0.0448) (0.0500) (0.0460) (0.0552) (0.0505) (0.0565) (0.0541) (0.0576) (0.444) (0.485) 
Time-varying company controls No No No No No No No No No No 
Only government-owned companies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 5,385 1,009 5,385 1,009 5,385 1,009 5,385 1,009 5,385 1,009 
R2 0.935 0.950 0.916 0.948 0.846 0.892 0.737 0.779 0.666 0.704 
Notes: Estimates are based on a sample containing data from Finnish state-owned companies from 2004-2017. All regressions include company fixed effects, year fixed effects, and controls 
for company-specific industry categories. Time-varying company controls are listed in the appendix table A1. Observations in all columns are weighted on the number of workers in each 
company. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on the company level 
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Table A4 
Sample summary statistics per year – all state-owned companies 
Year 
Nr of 
companies 
Mean 
employee 
count 
Median 
board size 
Mean 
board Size 
Median 
women on 
board 
Mean 
women on 
board 
Mean % 
women on 
board 
Median % 
women on 
board 
Female 
Employee 
Share 
Women in 
top 5 % 
Women in 
top 10% 
Women in 
top 25% 
Women in 
Top 5 
1994 158 214.6 5.5 5.17 0 0.11 0.022 0.000 0.339 0.155 0.206 0.292 1.013 
1995 167 308.5 6 5.72 0 0.38 0.067 0.000 0.331 0.191 0.243 0.308 1.018 
1996 164 312.5 6 5.96 1 0.79 0.133 0.167 0.343 0.265 0.346 0.438 1.122 
1997 274 189.8 6 5.90 1 1.09 0.184 0.167 0.362 0.108 0.120 0.172 1.000 
1998 298 192.9 6 5.88 1 1.30 0.221 0.167 0.364 0.110 0.126 0.174 0.970 
1999 357 160.9 6 5.84 1 1.43 0.246 0.167 0.372 0.110 0.130 0.162 0.989 
2000 410 186.2 6 5.78 1 1.46 0.252 0.167 0.359 0.102 0.119 0.179 0.937 
2001 459 174.1 6 5.71 1 1.44 0.252 0.167 0.363 0.181 0.200 0.226 0.893 
2002 501 157.2 6 5.72 1 1.41 0.247 0.167 0.365 0.184 0.196 0.228 0.982 
2003 542 146.5 5 5.61 1 1.47 0.263 0.200 0.369 0.209 0.221 0.254 0.972 
2004 638 134.4 5 5.52 1 1.43 0.258 0.200 0.378 0.226 0.236 0.258 1.000 
2005 549 145.2 5 5.74 1 1.58 0.275 0.200 0.394 0.223 0.246 0.280 1.087 
2006 511 151.0 5 5.77 2 1.62 0.281 0.400 0.390 0.150 0.167 0.210 1.070 
2007 492 156.6 5 5.81 2 1.65 0.284 0.400 0.386 0.129 0.169 0.207 1.122 
2008 476 159.9 5 5.78 2 1.69 0.292 0.400 0.394 0.151 0.167 0.214 1.155 
2009 446 150.6 6 5.93 2 1.82 0.307 0.333 0.390 0.152 0.177 0.224 1.135 
2010 436 152.4 6 5.88 2 1.83 0.312 0.333 0.387 0.144 0.173 0.214 1.165 
2011 421 154.3 6 5.93 2 1.85 0.312 0.333 0.383 0.131 0.164 0.204 1.216 
2012 403 157.7 6 5.92 2 1.86 0.314 0.333 0.380 0.144 0.182 0.217 1.154 
2013 383 152.4 6 5.94 2 1.88 0.316 0.333 0.381 0.145 0.163 0.217 1.178 
2014 369 140.8 6 5.90 2 1.89 0.320 0.333 0.377 0.153 0.172 0.212 1.089 
2015 344 141.3 6 5.92 2 1.90 0.321 0.333 0.361 0.153 0.174 0.210 1.134 
2016 356 131.3 6 5.97 2 1.93 0.324 0.333 0.370 0.169 0.192 0.230 1.197 
2017 334 132.8 6 6.50 2 2.17 0.335 0.333 0.391 0.195 0.211 0.247 1.314 
Notes: All numbers are unweighted means or medians. The sample is limited to companies that existed in 2004. 
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Table A5 
Sample summary statistics per year – Municipality-owned companies 
Year 
Nr of 
companies 
Mean 
employee 
count 
Median 
board size 
Mean 
board Size 
Median 
women on 
board 
Mean 
women on 
board 
Mean % 
women on 
board 
Median % 
women on 
board 
Female 
Employee 
Share 
Women in 
top 5 % 
Women in 
top 10% 
Women in 
top 25% 
Women in 
Top 5 
1994 110 30.8 7 6.63 0 0.25 0.038 0 0.341 0.166 0.211 0.290 1.182 
1995 109 27.0 6 6.02 0 0.47 0.078 0 0.324 0.198 0.234 0.271 1.138 
1996 108 30.5 6 6.12 1 0.95 0.155 0.167 0.330 0.242 0.306 0.395 1.120 
1997 206 23.1 6 6.06 1 1.28 0.211 0.167 0.368 0.104 0.113 0.163 1.112 
1998 225 23.1 6 6.02 2 1.61 0.268 0.333 0.370 0.103 0.119 0.172 1.084 
1999 280 18.5 6 5.96 2 1.70 0.285 0.333 0.371 0.101 0.116 0.146 1.093 
2000 330 16.9 6 5.88 2 1.67 0.284 0.333 0.359 0.100 0.116 0.175 1.024 
2001 365 17.0 6 5.89 2 1.64 0.279 0.333 0.365 0.189 0.211 0.234 0.981 
2002 382 17.7 6 5.99 2 1.64 0.274 0.333 0.363 0.194 0.202 0.234 1.086 
2003 409 17.0 6 5.95 2 1.73 0.291 0.333 0.371 0.226 0.238 0.272 1.076 
2004 480 16.7 6 5.89 2 1.66 0.282 0.333 0.387 0.246 0.254 0.279 1.083 
2005 432 19.9 6 6.04 2 1.76 0.291 0.333 0.401 0.234 0.254 0.291 1.146 
2006 411 20.9 6 6.04 2 1.76 0.291 0.333 0.396 0.146 0.165 0.207 1.124 
2007 398 21.6 6 6.08 2 1.77 0.292 0.333 0.392 0.119 0.167 0.206 1.178 
2008 387 22.1 6 6.04 2 1.81 0.299 0.333 0.395 0.144 0.160 0.207 1.199 
2009 364 23.6 6 6.20 2 1.95 0.314 0.333 0.386 0.142 0.166 0.215 1.151 
2010 360 23.7 6 6.10 2 1.92 0.316 0.333 0.381 0.132 0.163 0.206 1.175 
2011 349 23.9 6 6.17 2 1.95 0.316 0.333 0.375 0.113 0.151 0.194 1.209 
2012 334 23.0 6 6.19 2 1.94 0.314 0.333 0.374 0.132 0.175 0.207 1.153 
2013 319 22.4 6 6.21 2 1.95 0.314 0.333 0.373 0.129 0.146 0.204 1.154 
2014 308 22.0 6 6.14 2 1.94 0.315 0.333 0.372 0.137 0.155 0.199 1.078 
2015 288 21.2 6 6.17 2 1.94 0.314 0.333 0.347 0.129 0.151 0.191 1.090 
2016 302 18.8 6 6.18 2 1.97 0.319 0.333 0.360 0.149 0.176 0.216 1.152 
2017 285 19.5 6 6.67 2 2.20 0.329 0.333 0.383 0.180 0.192 0.233 1.263 
Notes: All numbers are unweighted means or medians. The sample is limited to companies that existed in 2004. 
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Table A6 
Sample summary statistics per year – Government-owned companies 
Year 
Nr of 
companies 
Mean 
employee 
count 
Median 
board size 
Mean 
board Size 
Median 
women on 
board 
Mean 
women on 
board 
Mean % 
women on 
board 
Median % 
women on 
board 
Female 
Employee 
Share 
Women in 
top 5 % 
Women in 
top 10% 
Women in 
top 25% 
Women in 
Top 5 
1994 46 663.2 3.5 4.00 0 0.00 0.000 0 0.348 0.652 0.202 0.309 0.652 
1995 54 899.4 5 5.34 0 0.29 0.053 0 0.362 0.815 0.280 0.401 0.815 
1996 54 887.8 6 5.76 0 0.54 0.094 0 0.374 1.130 0.421 0.525 1.130 
1997 67 705.2 5 5.27 0 0.54 0.103 0 0.349 0.672 0.145 0.201 0.672 
1998 73 716.1 5 5.46 0 0.36 0.066 0 0.344 0.616 0.146 0.179 0.616 
1999 76 685.2 5 5.38 0 0.45 0.084 0 0.372 0.605 0.178 0.215 0.605 
2000 79 893.5 5 5.35 0 0.59 0.110 0 0.358 0.570 0.128 0.191 0.570 
2001 93 790.4 5 5.00 0 0.60 0.120 0 0.354 0.559 0.158 0.196 0.559 
2002 118 608.1 5 4.84 0 0.67 0.138 0 0.369 0.644 0.175 0.208 0.644 
2003 131 551.3 4 4.54 0 0.66 0.145 0 0.359 0.664 0.167 0.200 0.664 
2004 156 496.5 4 4.34 0 0.66 0.153 0 0.349 0.756 0.180 0.194 0.756 
2005 115 616.0 4 4.57 0.5 0.87 0.190 0.13 0.370 0.870 0.218 0.241 0.870 
2006 99 690.6 4 4.62 1 1.04 0.226 0.25 0.364 0.848 0.180 0.223 0.848 
2007 93 733.9 4 4.59 1 1.09 0.238 0.25 0.360 0.849 0.174 0.208 0.849 
2008 88 765.2 4 4.56 1 1.14 0.249 0.25 0.387 0.966 0.196 0.237 0.966 
2009 82 697.1 4 4.61 1 1.23 0.266 0.25 0.406 1.061 0.228 0.261 1.061 
2010 76 753.5 5 4.76 1 1.38 0.290 0.20 0.419 1.118 0.225 0.251 1.118 
2011 72 777.3 4 4.66 1 1.32 0.284 0.25 0.424 1.250 0.228 0.256 1.250 
2012 68 815.3 4 4.55 1 1.43 0.314 0.25 0.412 1.162 0.224 0.267 1.162 
2013 63 812.6 4 4.52 1 1.52 0.336 0.25 0.425 1.317 0.251 0.288 1.317 
2014 60 752.6 4 4.51 1 1.61 0.358 0.25 0.403 1.150 0.258 0.275 1.150 
2015 55 772.1 4 4.53 1 1.64 0.363 0.25 0.436 1.345 0.293 0.302 1.345 
2016 53 774.8 5 4.69 1 1.71 0.364 0.20 0.426 1.434 0.290 0.308 1.434 
2017 48 808.0 5 5.43 2 2.04 0.376 0.40 0.440 1.604 0.331 0.330 1.604 
Notes: All numbers are unweighted means or medians. The sample is limited to companies that existed in 2004. 
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Table A7 
Sample summary statistics per year – State-owned companies with 0 women on their board 
Year 
Nr of 
companies 
Mean 
employee 
count 
Median 
board size 
Mean 
board Size 
Median 
women on 
board 
Mean 
women on 
board 
Mean % 
women on 
board 
Median % 
women on 
board 
Female 
Employee 
Share 
Women in 
top 5 % 
Women in 
top 10% 
Women in 
top 25% 
Women in 
Top 5 
1994 5 262.6 3 4.00 0 0 0 0 0.240 0.013 0.097 0.370 0.400 
1995 22 827.0 5 5.32 0 0 0 0 0.280 0.047 0.106 0.212 0.773 
1996 31 634.1 6 6.13 0 0 0 0 0.338 0.226 0.352 0.452 1.129 
1997 46 360.6 5 5.37 0 0 0 0 0.312 0.089 0.088 0.142 0.804 
1998 59 322.8 5 5.15 0 0 0 0 0.305 0.116 0.128 0.165 0.593 
1999 66 291.5 5 5.00 0 0 0 0 0.301 0.094 0.119 0.149 0.636 
2000 77 271.5 5 4.95 0 0 0 0 0.307 0.101 0.103 0.160 0.558 
2001 94 227.5 5 4.74 0 0 0 0 0.305 0.137 0.144 0.168 0.500 
2002 117 205.2 5 4.68 0 0 0 0 0.300 0.135 0.145 0.162 0.658 
2003 132 183.1 5 4.61 0 0 0 0 0.303 0.144 0.159 0.175 0.598 
2004 180 162.7 4 4.54 0 0 0 0 0.314 0.175 0.184 0.200 0.728 
2005 115 165.7 5 4.63 0 0 0 0 0.326 0.189 0.206 0.234 0.817 
2006 88 192.7 4 4.65 0 0 0 0 0.296 0.142 0.147 0.173 0.761 
2007 75 107.7 5 4.75 0 0 0 0 0.278 0.071 0.110 0.132 0.693 
2008 60 113.6 5 4.87 0 0 0 0 0.305 0.123 0.114 0.164 0.883 
2009 47 147.0 5 4.81 0 0 0 0 0.317 0.110 0.159 0.189 0.957 
2010 47 128.8 5 4.94 0 0 0 0 0.301 0.061 0.067 0.143 0.851 
2011 43 135.9 5 4.88 0 0 0 0 0.293 0.108 0.098 0.160 0.953 
2012 40 144.6 5 4.83 0 0 0 0 0.265 0.064 0.085 0.150 0.850 
2013 35 135.2 5 4.86 0 0 0 0 0.287 0.112 0.100 0.161 0.857 
2014 30 99.2 5 4.60 0 0 0 0 0.297 0.059 0.093 0.158 0.800 
2015 27 62.7 5 4.85 0 0 0 0 0.320 0.205 0.194 0.254 0.963 
2016 25 57.5 5 4.76 0 0 0 0 0.352 0.178 0.175 0.256 1.000 
2017 23 61.2 5 4.87 0 0 0 0 0.366 0.230 0.261 0.233 1.087 
Notes: All numbers are unweighted means or medians. The sample is limited to companies that existed in 2004. 
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Table A8 
Effect of board gender quota on female outcomes in Finnish government-owned companies. Instrumental variables regressions 
 Government-owned Companies 
Dependent Variable 
Female Employee 
share 
Share of female employees with earning above 
 the … in the earnings distribution 
Number of women 
among top 5 earners 
 75th percentile 90th percentile 95th percentile  
  (1) (3) (5) (7) (9) 
Percent women on board in year t -0.00129 0.203 -0.189 -0.0369 -1.543 
(0.120) (0.122) (0.138) (0.140) (1.839) 
Time-varying company controls No No No No No 
Instrument year 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
Observations 889 889 889 889 889 
R2 0.084 0.009 0.044 0.009 -0.106 
Notes: Estimates are based on a sample containing data from Finnish government-owned companies from 2004-2017. All regressions include company fixed effects, 
year fixed effects, and controls for company-specific industry categories. Observations in all columns are weighted on the number of workers in each company. The 
appendix table A1 reports the first-stage regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on the company level 
